Logical Investigations. Edmund Husserl. Translated by J. N. Findlay from the Second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen with a new Preface by. Edmund Husserl. Logical Investigations. Edmund Husserl. Translated by J. N. Findlay from the Second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen with a new . PDF | 55+ minutes read | The view that language is a vehicle for the Husserl's. Logical. Investigations. Conceived in part as a. response.

Husserl Logical Investigations Pdf

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Husserl, E. - Logical Investigations, Vol. - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf ) or view presentation slides online. THE INVESTIGATIONS: A NEGLECTED MASTERPIECE Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen, )1 is undoubtedly one of. These two paperback editions of Husserl's Logical Investigations – the first of which is a complete edition, the second an abridged edition – are.

Moreover, the relevant demand is not a demand to do just anything, but rather a demand to understand the meaning of certain authentic signs. Husserl claims that I can experience this demand in the case where I see another subject who is creating authentic signs in an attempt to communicate with me.

I there experience the other not only as one who is composing those signs, but also as one who is demanding me to understand them Hua XX-2, p. When my interlocutor presents those signs before me with communicative intent, I also experience her as demanding me to take those signs as authentic signs and to become aware of their meaning. Husserl further clarifies the experience of this demand by returning to the example of the storm-siren.

He states that when I hear the authentic storm-siren signal, I also experience the coast guard, who has sounded the siren, as placing a demand on me. I experience the coast guard as demanding me to execute the corresponding appropriate intention, whereby I would become aware of the incoming cyclone.

And my perception of myself has changed: I see myself not only as one who is being communicated with, but also as a demanded subject. Because the other has placed a demand on me to understand the signs, I experience the signs themselves as carrying a normative, if not even an ethical imperative to understand them. For example, when I first open the pages of a book, Husserl asserts that, because the author, who composed her book to communicate with others, is not there demanding me to understand her written words, it is possible that I may not experience the demand of the author at all.

Yet, if I did not experience the demand of the other, it seems that I would also not experience myself as a subject who is demanded to understand the words and that I would thus not experience the words as that which I should understand. This trace is the result of a certain habituation. During my previous communicative interactions with other subjects, when those other subjects spoke to me, they demanded me to understand their words.

Because I have encountered word signs as always accompanied by these personal demands throughout my life, I have become accustomed or habituated to the fact that I am always demanded to understand linguistic signs.

According to Husserl, over the course of time, by means of this habituation, the personal demands of the other subjects to understand their signs transfuses or percolates into the linguistic signs themselves. As a result, when the signs appear before me on the page, even if no subject is there to demand that I understand them, I still experience these written signs as something that I am demanded to understand. This demand, which I experience, does not arise from nowhere or no one, but rather comes from the signs themselves: I experience the signs as demanding me to understand them Hua XX-2, pp.

In other words, via the habituation, the signs have become endowed gestiftet with the capacity to demand. Crucially, according to Husserl, once I experience the sign as demanding me to understand it, just as is the case when another demands me to understand it, I experience myself as demanded and the sign appears with its should.

The sign is, in that case, performing both functions, as it demands me and appears to me as something I should understand. Husserl summarizes these conclusions by writing, We can also say: The habitual sign is a carrier of a practical demand, and truly an impersonal [unpersonalen] demand, which is no longer the conscious realization of previous willing. Instead of me demanding myself or someone else demanding me, it is the sign that so demands me, and it demands me purely in and of itself and not as a correlate of a personal demand Hua XX—2, p.

Even when I am not in the presence of a subject who is creating authentic signs and demanding me to understand them, authentic signs will always be experienced with the demand and with the should. In contrast, when they are correctly perceived, indicators will not manifest themselves with that demand or should. Moreover, even though I can take the smoke as an indicator for the blaze, it is not the case that the smoke presents itself to me as something that I should take to be an indicator for the fire.

I have not violated some normative or ethical imperative by not taking the smoke as the indicator for the fire. The essential distinction between signum and verbum in comparison with image consciousness and with the expression of the soul in its bodily-ness. As elucidated, Husserl claimed in M1 that the distinction between them is that the former are not categorially or grammatically structured and that the latter are.

By working from and beyond these definitions, in M3, Husserl introduces new differences between these two kinds of signs. He discovers these novel distinctions by questioning the other central tenet of his semiotics. Is it truly the case, Husserl inquires, that all signs — and thus all signals and categorial signs — execute their operations in three steps?

On the one hand, he concludes that signals certainly are experienced in three steps and he analyzes those three phases in detail. On the other hand, Husserl comes to affirm that categorial signs do not signify in three steps. Instead, he presents the novel idea that when I am presented with categorial signs, I pass through or beyond the words to the meant and expressed state of affairs all in one step.

Husserl not only reiterates these points from the Investigations, but also recognizes that his descriptions of those three steps from that text did not sufficiently elucidate our experiences of them.

As such, in this manuscript, he executes a considerable analysis of these three stages and he thereby provides additional clarification to two elements of this whole three-step experience.

He claims that my intuitive awareness of the signal and my signitive intending of the signaled are two distinct consciousnesses, which have two distinct objects. He further asserts that there is a temporal difference between these two intentions.

At point T1, I intuitively experience the signal and then, via the motivation originating from that signal, at point T2, I signitively intend the signaled object. As Husserl claims in this quote, he does not think that the two intendings are entirely disconnected; he believes that they are bound.

He claims that when I see the signal sign, I am motivated to transition directly from an awareness of the signal to a consciousness of the signaled object. Signification is, by definition, a linear arrow-like guidance from the apparent sign to the signified. He arrives at this insight for two interrelated reasons. First, he sees that there is no sharp distinction between the first and third steps of this process.

There is no strong division between my consciousness of the categorial sign and of its meant state of affairs, as there is between the experience of the signal and of its signaled. I do not experience the linguistic sign and then, subsequently, the state of affairs.

Of course, when I am reading, I must be intending the authentic linguistic signs, if I am to be able to become aware of the meant state of affairs, but Husserl states that this intending of the words is not distinct or separate from the consciousness of the state of affairs. The intuition of the word is not a whole intention in and of itself, but is rather subsumed into or united with the intending of the state of affairs from the start.

As a result of this subsumption or fusion, the categorial signs do not become thematic to me, as I instead only attend to the meant state of affairs. He recognizes that the movement from the linguistic sign to its state of affairs is not, correctly considered, a transition at all.

Whereas, when I perceive a signal, I experience a linear arrow-like motivation to go from the signal to the signaled, there is no true passage from the awareness of the categorial sign to another and distinct consciousness of the meant state of affairs. The fact that the intending of the word is subsumed into the intending of the meaning, can be justified when one recognizes that when I see the words, I immediately pass through or beyond those linguistic signs to the meant state of affairs.

He writes, I go over and beyond the word in a certain manner. Because categorial language signs lack this pointing-beyond-themselves-to-another, and because — during his analysis of signals — Husserl defined the signitive function of a sign as this motivational arrow-like pointing to the signified, Husserl judges that language does not, technically considered, signify. Because there is no true shift from the linguistic categorial signs to the meant state of affairs, there is no sharp distinction between them.

The word-consciousness and the meaning-consciousness are fused together, such that the categorial sign means and names its state of affairs immediately and at once. By returning to examine and describe the different ways one can be conscious of signs and their referents, Husserl realizes that those experiences are more complex and varied than he had previously thought.

In the three manuscripts, which were examined throughout the second half of this essay, Husserl reverses the idea that there are indicators and expressive signs, instead claiming that there are indicators, signals, and signs. He also further spells out how signal signs can execute their signitive operation in three steps. Finally, he concludes, in contrast to his claims from the First Logical Investigation, that categorial linguistic signs do not signify their objects in three stages, as I instead immediately pass through the words to become aware of the state of affairs, which those words mean.

In a stream-of-consciousness like manner, he works through his proposals, testing them against the phenomena, overturning and returning to and overturning them again.

Because Husserl left many issues still unaddressed and because his writings open up so many possibilities, these research texts also demand us to think beyond them. By doing so and by taking part in the communal phenomenological project — of checking our theses against the things themselves for ourselves — we can work with and beyond the founder and master of phenomenology so as to develop a continually more accurate phenomenological semiotics.

Bibliographie Hua XII. Husserl, E. Philosophie der Arithmetik.

Husserl's Logical Investigations

Eley Ed. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. Philosophy of Arithmetic. Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from Willard Trans.

Dordrecht: Kluwer. Hua XIX. Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Teil. Panzer Ed. Logical Investigations Vol. I and II. Findlay Trans.

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New York: Routledge. Hua XX—1. Erster Teil. Melle Ed. Den Haag: Kluwer Publishers. Hua XX—2. Benoist, J. Mayer Ed. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Bernet, R. Marbach, and E. Kern, I. An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern. Logische Untersuchung.

Berlin: Akademie. Byrne, T. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 4 , — Husserl Studies 33 3 , — Studia Phaenomenologica 17, — Bundgaard, P. Husserl and language.

Schmicking and S. Gallagher Eds. Dordrecht: Springer. De Palma, V. Drummond, J. Pure logical grammar: Anticipatory categoriality and articulated categoriality.

International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 2 , — Pure logical grammar: Identity amidst linguistic differences. Lau and J. Drummond Eds. New York: Springer.

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Edie, J. Embree Ed. Hanna, R. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 3 , — Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. Mayer V. Die Bedeutung objektivierende Akte V. Mohanty, J. A transcendental theory does not investigate what is given in experience, nor that which is beyond experience, but what is before experience, i. The Kantian transcendental subject is not subjectivity as described by the subject, but a principle of logical and epistemological foundation.

In other words, the categories of understanding and forms of sensibility are, for Kant, conditions without which the synthetic a priori knowledge about the phenomena would not be possible.

Such categories do not come from experience, since they are those that make the experience possible. The experience only gives us objects. The subjective conditions are not objects at all, and therefore cannot be given in experience. The argument works for the method of reflection, which is found in inner sense. There are conditions without which the inner sense would not be possible, for example, the form of time.

Husserl seeks to accomplish something that would have haunted both classic empiricists and Kant. On the one hand, he wants to erect phenomenology from data obtained through inner perception, but, on the other hand, he seeks to achieve, as Kant did, a priori knowledge regarding the subjectivity, that is, universal and necessary knowledge.

What we should examine carefully is how he intends to do it and what Husserl means by a priori. For Husserl, a priori knowledge is knowledge of essences eidos. The eidetic intuition, the vision of essence Wesensschau , can be understood, in the broadest sense of word, as a kind of experience. It is impossible for me to evaluate something as being good or useful without having an experience of presentation in that something.

This law is valid for any valuation act, no matter what it is. The valuation act is not the act of presentation, since it is possible to have an act of presentation without having an act of valuation. On the other hand, the relationship that exists between the experience of valuing and the experience of presentation is not discovered by induction.

It is not the result of a generalization. It is impossible for an experience of valuing to exist without an experience of presentation just as it is impossible for a sound without a crest. This is an a priori law, a law that expresses a necessary relationship between different types of experiences in this case, the experience of valuing and the experience of presenting. Each class of experiences, such as knowing, remembering, fantasizing and meaning have its own kind of structure.

Therefore, eidetic psychology must: i classify the types of experiences, ii conceptually fix the essential structure of each type of experience, iii clarify the essential relationships between the different types of experiences, and iv clarify the forms of relationships between the experiences and other entities the body itself, the world, culture, etc.

The structure of sensitive perceptual experiences is different from affective experiences, which, in turn, is different from that of remembering experiences or linguistic experiences, etc. Husserl opposes fact and essence. Every fact is a unique, unrepeatable event and is subject to time. Essence, on the other hand, is something ideal and can be exemplified in several facts. That is, several real e so different facts may have the same ideal essence.

Two experiences of perception taken in their factuality are never identical; however, the essence of perception is always the same. With the distinction between fact and essence, Husserl distinguished the psychology of facts or empirical psychology and psychology of essences. At this point, there is much misunderstanding present in the Husserlian literature. Firstly, it is not true that Husserl rejects the psychology of facts empirical psychology.

There are several problems regarding the idea of founding logic in an empirical science. For Husserl, logic is an a priori science, that is, a universal and necessary science, whereas empirical psychology is, at best, a contingent science able to obtain probable knowledge.

However, the impossibility of founding necessary laws in contingent laws does not imply abandoning the project to founding logic in a theory of subjectivity. On the contrary, it is an important task founding logic in an essential analysis of logical experiences.

Founding, in this context, does not mean to deduce logic from psychology, mas clarify the relationship between logic and subjectivity. Eidetic psychology limits itself to takes a fact as an exemplary of an essence. The psychic fact, obtained by inner perception, is nothing more than the initial route of access to the essence, grabbed by eidetic intuition. Ideality and reality In the light of the previous discussion, we can now affirm that Husserl, in Logical investigations, remains, to some extent, stuck to the tradition of seeking the foundation of the theory of knowledge in a science of subjectivity.

But this is only true to a certain extent, because this subjective direction of the research consists of half of the task. To understand what knowledge is, we need another direction of research that is complementary, whose task is to establish the conditions of objective possibility or logic of knowledge, which are based on the objective-ideal content of knowledge. Husserl distinguishes the noetic from the objective conditions of possibility of knowledge.

The noetic conditions lie in the subject. They concern the conditions that any knowing subject must have to achieve knowledge. For this reason, these conditions do not regard to the empirical peculiarity of human knowledge as being psychologically conditioned; For the other hand, we have purely logical conditions, i.

Noetic conditions concern the structure of knowing lived experiences, whereas the logic conditions concern the logical content of the knowing experiences. It is true that we cannot really separate the objective content and the experience of knowledge, as we cannot really separate the tone and the sound. However, although inseparable, they are distinguishable.

Two or more experiences of knowledge may have the same objective content. Each experience of knowledge that occurs in the stream of consciousness is always a unique experience, distinct from other experiences. An experience never repeats itself identically. Two or more people cannot have the same exact experiences. However, the objective content, as it is not a real integral part of experience, can be repeated and shared among various subjects.

This distinction, between the experience of knowledge and its objective content plays an crucial role in Logical Investigations. It is precisely this distinction that delimits the field of phenomenology from the field of logic. Phenomenology deals with lived experiences and, particularly, with the experiences of knowledge, while pure logic deals with the formal structures of the objective-ideal content of theoretical knowledge.

For Husserl, science is not the sum of all experiences or acts of knowledge: We understand a theory as a certain ideal content of possible knowledge and, exactly in the same way, we understand the truth, the law, etc The linguistic signs, therefore, do not transmit experiences, but rather ideal contents. We can say that science, for Husserl, is a systematic theoretical set of objective ideal meanings that deals with a given field of objects. The task of pure logic is to investigate the necessary structures that belong to every possible theory, i.

If pure logic investigates the essence of ideal objective structures meanings, theories, proposals, etc. The key of Logical Investigations is that, for Husserl, there is a correlation between logic and phenomenology. There is a correlation between the objective-ideal-logical content and the logical experience. That is the correlation that we should now examine.

The empiricist conception of subjectivity is not only blind to ideality, but is also incompatible with them. But if Husserl shows that the assumptions present in empiricism violates the objective conditions of knowledge, this does not imply abandoning the idea that epistemology requires a theory of subjectivity.

On the contrary, the thesis of objectivity of logical entities requires a certain conception of subjectivity, in which the psychological subject is able to access them. Therefore, the objective conditions of theoretical knowledge imply subjective conditions. One of these conditions is the intentionality of consciousness. Consciousness is not a closed box.

It is not true that consciousness can only grasp what is found inside itself, i.

Husserl logical investigations ii pdf

If this were the case, the apprehension of ideal entities not psychic and objective would be impossible. If I am aware of a table, the experience of perception is subjective, it belongs to a stream-of-consciousness, but the intentional object, the table, is not subjective. The table is something that transcends the real content of experience. Similarly, if I am aware of a theorem, the object of my consciousness is the theorem itself, and not my experience of representing the theorem.

As we have seen, the acceptance of ideal entities implies accepting an intentional theory of subjectivity. However, for Husserl, it is not enough to postulate noetic or subjective conditions of knowledge, such as intentionality and the ability to see the truth evidence. It is not sufficient to assert, in a purely argumentative way, that such conditions must effectively exist in the subject, because otherwise we would have, as consequence, the impossibility of knowledge.

Once this final task is a requirement, a psychology founded on inner vision reflection is required. Empiricism was right to refuse the dogmatic postulation of a transcendental subject as being inaccessible to experience and to defend the faithful description of subjectivity. It was blind to the intentionality of consciousness and, in particular, to the experiences in which the essences are captured.

The only way to understand how a subject is able to know is by using a new psychology, which is descriptive, intentional, a priori, and based on reflection.

With this, phenomenology becomes, first of all, a study of correlations between the structures of consciousness and the structures of the object or objectivity. This situation can also be expressed as follows: to know a thing, it is necessary to know its ways of donation.

And to understand the ways something manifests itself we should step back to consciousness. The condition for the object manifests itself leis not in itself but in conscious. Every phenomenon is a phenomenon of something for someone. And each kind of object has its own way of manifestation, and as consequence.

What is the difference between being aware of a theorem, a computer, a state of affairs, a concept, or a judicative experience? What is the difference between being aware of a table, seeing it, and being aware of the same table, without seeing it? According to Husserl, there are structural differences among the various forms of consciousness. And each form of intention experience has, as correlate, different kind of objects.

The structure of experience in which a theorem is apprehend different from an experience in which the feeling of others is apprehend.Traditionally presentations have been taken to be simple, but, Husserl argues, the presentation Emperor differs from the presentation Pope, so there must be a distinction between act of presentation and its content.

A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive: being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. According to this immanent description as carried out by Brentano sense data stood out as essentially different from the psychic acts which grasped them.

Grossmann, On the Con- tent and Object of Presentations. Collected Works, Vol. Dermot Moran. It is my view that Husserl's turn to transcendental idealism merely confirms this departure from Brentano already evident in the First Edition of the Investigations.